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EVERYDAY EUROPE: IMMIGRATION, TRANSNATIONAL MOBIL-
ITY AND THE “WICKED PROBLEM” OF BREXIT. 
 
Russell King 
University of Sussex 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Scholars and students interested in migration and mobility in Europe will be familiar 
with the landmark studies of Adrian Favell and Ettore Recchi; both single-authored and 
jointly produced 1 . Eurostars and Eurocities (Favell 2008) and Mobile Europe (Recchi 
2015) have been arguably their most significant individual contributions to the ongoing 
phenomenon of free movement within Europe. Without wishing to typecast these two 
books, they were written at a time of broadly enhanced and celebrated intra-European 
migration. With their latest book Everyday Europe, Recchi and Favell (Recchi, Favell et 
al. 2019)2 join forces to produce yet another landmark statement, this time at a juncture 
 
1 A full list of the publications of the two authors is impossible here: for the most significant see Favell (2008, 
2014), Recchi (2013, 2015), Recchi and Favell (2009). 
2 For the sake of conciseness, I reference Everyday Europe in this paper as Recchi and Favell (2019) since 
they were the leaders of the EUCROSS project, of which this book is the principal outcome, and they coor-
dinated the editing and production of the book. However, I very much appreciate the democratic way that 
the cover and the title page list all 16 authors who contributed to the book, and I cite it here and in the 
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when “Europe has become a continent of gloom” (Favell and Recchi, 2019, p. 1) charac-
terised by a decade of economic retrenchment, increasingly “dissensual politics”, and a 
lurch towards right-wing populism founded on nationalism and anti-immigration rheto-
ric. 
In my contribution to this review symposium, I aim to do two things. First, I record my 
impressions of the book, highlighting what, for me, are its most significant and interest-
ing findings. Inevitably, this will be a subjective and partial account, given the richness 
and variety of the book’s contents. I pick a number of key findings in the book to reflect 
on the changing nature of what the authors call “social transnationalism” from the 
unique perspective of “Brexiting Britain”. This links to the second part of my essay, which 
is a more direct interpretation of the dynamics of Brexit. I do this in full admission that 
part of the motive for doing so is a kind of personal catharsis, to unload some of the 
frustrations that have dogged me every day since that fateful vote on 23 June 2016. 
However, in an attempt to give this part of the paper some theoretical originality, I frame 
the ongoing Brexit process as a “wicked problem”.  
 
 
Everyday Europe: highlights and issues for debate 
 
It is worth starting off with a recital of the full title of the EU 7th Framework EUCROSS 
project on which this book is solidly based: “The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-
Border Practices and Transnational Identities among EU and Third-Country Citizens”. 
Like most EU-funded projects, it is not truly pan-European in that the empirics of the 
project’s data collection, carried out in the early 2010s, were limited to the seven partner 
countries: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom and Turkey. 
Of these countries, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK can be regarded, in trans-
national migration terms, as “mature” countries of immigration (less so Italy and Spain), 
whilst Romania and Turkey are two well-chosen examples of countries with widespread 
“labour diaspora” populations present in several European countries – Turkey since the 
“guestworker” migrations of the 1960s and 1970s, Romania mainly since EU accession 
in 2007. 
In order to understand the mechanics of data collection beyond the briefest of state-
ments given in the opening chapter, it is necessary to turn to the methodological appen-
dix (Pötzschke, Braun, Ciornei and Apaydin 2019). This is where I started my reading of 
the book. Two research instruments underpin the analysis. The first is the EUCROSS 
 
reference list at the end of the paper in its full form (Recchi, Favell, Apaydin, Barbulescu, Braun, Ciornei, 
Cunningham, Díez Medrano, Duru, Hanquinet, Pötzschke, Reimer, Salamońska, Savage, Solgaard Jensen and 
Varela 2019), as well as referencing all the individual chapters. 
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quantitative survey: a computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) administered to 
quota-samples of 1000 resident “national” respondents in each of the six EU partner 
countries, plus a further 250 “migrant” respondents from each of Romania and Turkey 
resident in each of the other five countries (excepting Turks in Spain, whose number is 
too small). The total CATI questionnaires collected are thus an impressive N=8500. The 
second research instrument is the semi-structured qualitative interview survey called 
EUMEAN, aimed at exploring in more detail the “meaning” of the participants’ cross-
border mobilities and activities. For this latter survey, quota-samples were specified of 
10 “nationals” per country for each subsample of the survey, hence 60 across the six EU 
countries, plus 50 Romanian and 50 Turkish respondents in their five host countries, for 
a total N of 160 interviews. Taken together, EUCROSS and EUMEAN represent a robust, 
complementary research design generating a mass of data which form the empirical 
backbone of the book. 
I raise three questions about the methods used. First, the CATI survey and interview 
narratives are all based on individuals’ responses, and I wonder whether a small part of 
the huge research effort could have been directed to organising some focus groups. By 
virtue of their creative group dynamics, focus groups can yield insightful, co-created nar-
rative and discussion material. Second, I am troubled by the low acceptance rates for 
the CATI survey: from a low of 9% (hence 91% refusal rate) for the UK to a more reason-
able 38% for Romania. This makes me concerned at the possibility of bias in the self-
selection of respondents, although I am partially reassured by what is described as “post-
stratification” of three key socio-demographic variables to match national population 
census distributions. For the EUMEAN narrative interviews, a more explicit bias was de-
liberately introduced, by which a number of EUCROSS respondents were purposively se-
lected for follow-up face-to-face interviews on the basis of their high levels of physical 
and virtual mobility. As long as this positive transnational selectivity is recognised, the 
narrative extracts included in the three chapters that use them must be regarded as 
purely illustrative rather than representative. This leads to my third critique, which is 
that surprisingly little weight is given to the interview narratives, which are under-uti-
lised compared to the exhaustive quantitative analysis of the CATI data.  
I now proceed to more substantive comments on the book’s wide-ranging contents 
and key findings. Once again, selectivity prevails; indeed, blatant cherry-picking. I try to 
identify one or two key highlights from each chapter which I think are particularly im-
portant, and which provide links to the second part of this review paper, on the “Brexit 
turn” in the UK. The book consists of eight chapters, plus a chapter-length Introduction 
and a similar-length Epilogue; in effect ten chapters. 
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In the Introduction, Favell and Recchi (2019, p. 2) set out the dilemma which frames 
the book: “the disconnect between European society and European politics”. This has 
been mounting since the global financial crisis of 2008 and is characterised by the grow-
ing power of populist and nationalist political forces; yet the “social transnationalism” of 
“everyday Europe” proceeds apace. But here too lies another contradiction, which I be-
lieve lies at the heart of the diagnosis of the conflict over Brexit. Cross-border contacts 
of every kind – travel, tourism, second homes, study abroad, business and conference 
visits, migration, diversified consumption of international food and music – are expand-
ing fast if not exponentially. Cheaper and more efficient communication infrastructure 
– budget airlines, low-cost coach travel, high-speed trains, lowered telephone and WiFi 
charges – has been a major facilitator of this everyday transnationalism. Such cross-bor-
der contacts are emphasised and normalised in some accounts: a broad range of Euro-
pean society is now incessantly traversing European and international borders. But, and 
here comes the contradiction: are we all “mobile” and “European” now? No we are not. 
Those who live in and experience the social isolation of run-down urban estates and 
semi-subsistence rural peripheries have a different “worldview”, one that is localised, 
deprived and alienated. What I wish to highlight here is that (access to) mobility in all its 
forms – geographical, social, imaginative – is the new inequality. To be fair, Favell and 
Recchi acknowledge up front (2019, p. 3) the reality that the major dimensions of social 
transnationalism are not evenly distributed, but to my mind these inequalities need 
greater emphasis and exploration. So, in the EUMEAN interviews, instead of selecting 
only those who exhibit the top-quartile scores on the “transnationalism index”, why not 
probe the everyday lives of those with low scores? 
Chapter 1, on “cartographies of social transnationalism” (Savage, Cunningham, 
Reimer and Favell 2019), opens up a discussion on what is arguably the foundational 
concept of the book. Building on the definitive text of Mau (2010), social transnational-
ism is “transnationalism from below” and is shown to be surprisingly widespread; ac-
cording to Mau, half of all Germans spend holidays abroad (but, of course, half do not), 
and a similar proportion maintain regular connections with at least one friend or relative 
living abroad. This sets the context for the EUCROSS survey data on social transnational-
ism with revealing graphs and maps comparing the “performance” of respondents from 
the six EU countries. In terms of self-declared “familiarity with foreign countries”, the 
countries divide themselves in two: a northern group (Germany, Denmark and the UK) 
where 30–40% of respondents are familiar with two or more countries, and a southern 
group (Romania, Italy and Spain) where the corresponding share is only 15–20%. Whilst 
these figures do not support the common Brexit-related view of Britain as insular and 
inward-looking, what is different about the UK is its greater familiarity and connectivity 
to a diversity of non-European locations, above all the “Anglophone diaspora” of the 
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United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. According to Savage et 
al. (2019, p. 42), this indicates a peculiarly British cosmopolitanism of post-imperial 
whiteness (see also Savage, Wright and Gayo-Cal 2010). Not that the cosmopolitan reach 
of other EU countries is any less “white”, since their connections are mostly with other 
European countries based on geographical proximity and patterns of mobility and holi-
day-making. As expected, and across the board in all countries, “close connections” and 
“familiarity” with other countries are strongly correlated with higher education and bet-
ter economic status.  
The chapter closes with a revealing table on how these indicators of social transna-
tionalism are reflected in identification with being “European” and being a “world citi-
zen”. The British data stand out from the rest: 40% of UK respondents felt themselves to 
be “neither European nor a citizen of the world” (cf. 24% for the six EU countries as a 
group and only 12% for Spain); and 23% of UK respondents felt themselves to be a “citi-
zen of the world but not European” (cf. 14% for all countries and only 6–7% for Denmark 
and Germany). Meanwhile, only 27% of the British felt themselves to be “European and 
a citizen of the world” (cf. 46% for all countries and 66% for Spain), and finally only 10% 
of British respondents saw themselves as “European and not citizens of the world” (cf. 
16% for all countries and 27% for Denmark and Germany). 
Chapter 2 (Salamońska and Recchi 2019) furthers the exploration of social transna-
tionalism by analysing in more detail the social structure of cross-border practices. I 
found this a more rigorous and grounded discussion, given the vagueness through which 
the prior chapter approached social transnationalism using the notions of “familiarity 
with foreign countries” or “having close connections” in other countries. This chapter, 
then, is about specific types of cross-border mobility as recorded by EUCROSS survey 
respondents, drawing a distinction common in the “mobilities” literature (Recchi 2015; 
Urry 2007) between physical, corporeal mobilities, and virtual and imaginative mobili-
ties. The range of mobilities fed into the analysis included experiences of migration; re-
cent tourist trips abroad; communication with family/friends abroad via phone and 
email; communication via web-based social media to family/friends abroad; interna-
tional money transfers; shopping abroad; and following TV in a foreign language. The 
analysis is performed for the six EU countries’ respondent nationals plus Romanian and 
Turkish migrants. On a country-by-country basis, the UK respondents are not out of line 
with their fellow-EU nationals for any of the cross-border practices listed. They were, 
however, more likely to have communicated via social-media networks with friends and 
relatives abroad (presumably in the “Anglophone diaspora”), and they were less likely 
to watch foreign-language TV – two results which are arguably in line with “Brexit” 
tendencies. When the EU-nationals sample is subject to logistic regression analysis, 
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some interesting and significant social-structural relationships emerge, which reinforce 
my earlier point about inequality in access to various mobilities. The result is crystal-
clear (Salamońska and Recchi 2019, p. 73): “There is no form of mobility in which the 
probability of tertiary-educated respondents does not exceed that of the least educated 
very significantly” (meaning at least p< 0.01, and in most cases p< 0.001). Economic well-
being is only highly significant (p< 0.001) for frequency of travel to the EU. When the 
regression analysis is switched to the Romanian and Turkish migrant samples, the 
strength of these two significant findings is reversed: the effect of education is milder 
(since these are predominantly labour-migrant populations), but socioeconomic status 
has a bigger effect on all transnational practices than it does for the nationals, where the 
effect is limited to travel. 
Food and music enter the discussion in Chapter 3 (Hanquinet and Savage 2019): a 
more cultural exploration of social transnationalism. My musical knowledge is probably 
more limited than most people’s, but I wonder to what extent EUCROSS respondents 
can judge the differences between the musical genres they are asked to “like” or “dis-
like” on a five-point scale – classical, jazz, pop, rock, metal, hip hop, traditional from the 
country of residence, traditional from Europe, and world music. It comes as no surprise 
to learn that the Germans and Italians are the greatest admirers of classical music, given 
the national origins of so many world-famous composers, but other distinctions are baf-
fling and not so easy to explain.  
On the culinary front respondents were asked to nominate the three “foreign” cui-
sines they liked best out of the following: French, Italian, Spanish3, North-Central Europe, 
Nordic-Baltic, Southern European4, Anglo-Saxon, Turkish, Mexican, Asian, South Ameri-
can/Caribbean, and African. Once again, one questions respondents’ familiarity with 
some of these food categories. All nationalities rate Italian food as their favourite (52% 
overall, 64% in Germany down to 43% in the UK), except the British whose most fre-
quently liked cuisine is Asian (65%). Chicken tikka masala (actually, an “anglicised” Indian 
dish) has evidently replaced fish and chips (or pizza) as Britain’s national favourite. This 
is a simple indication of Britain’s enduring link with its former colonial empire, but also 
a reflection of the long history of South Asian migration to Britain. As expected, culinary 
preferences also vary by age and education. French cuisine is favoured more by older 
respondents; Asian by younger consumers; Italian is liked by all ages. On the education 
variable, preference for all foreign food correlates strongly with years of education. 
These are unique data, even if they hold few surprises. 
 
3 Which inexplicably includes “Maltese” (in reality closer to Italian). 
4 In reality Southeast European and Balkan. 
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Chapter 4 (Pötzschke and Braun 2019) is one of the most interesting in the emerging 
light of Brexit: it develops further the EUCROSS data on scales and layers of identification 
which were fleetingly introduced at the end of Chapter 1. Part of the rationale for the 
(to most European observers) surprising decision of the UK population to vote to leave 
the EU could be “explained” if, compared to other EU countries, the British could be 
shown to have a lower identification with Europe – and this is precisely what this chapter 
does, albeit this is not the main question which it sets out to answer5. The key dependent 
variable – identification with different geographic entities – is measured by a five-point-
scale response to five statements about “feeling a citizen of” i) the town where I live, ii) 
the region where I live, iii) the country of residence, iv) Europe, and v) the world. In Table 
1, I re-work some of the data from the authors’ Table 4.1 to draw out the British pattern 
more clearly. Across the board, the average level of identification, for all countries and 
all geographic scales, is 4.0, rather high. British citizens’ level of identification with Eu-
rope (2.9) is the only score in the table which is below 3.0. The rest of the data are self-
explanatory, but it is worth noting that the mean British identification score for all geo-
graphic entities, 3.7, is the lowest of the six countries. Across all countries, the “country 
of residence” identification score is pre-eminent, although Spain is a slight exception. 
The subsequent multivariate analysis of the influence of various transnational practices 
on the level of European identification confirms that the UK is in an outlier position, first 
because of its weak European identity, but also because it is the country where, at the 
individual level, the experience of transnational practices makes the most significant 
contribution to “feeling European”. 
 
Table 1. Scales of identification amongst the national populations of six EU countries 
 City Region Country of 
residence 
Europe World Average 
British 3.9 3.8 4.3 2.9 3.4 3.7 
Danes 4.4 4.5 4.8 3.9 3.4 4.2 
Germans 4.0 3.9 4.3 4.0 3.4 3.9 
Italians 3.9 3.9 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.9 
Romanians 4.3 4.3 4.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 
Spanish 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.2 
Average 4.1 4.1 4.4 3.8 3.7 4.0 
Source: EUCROSS data in Pötzschke and Braun (2019, p. 125). 
 
 
5 The key research question framing the chapter is about whether, and which aspects of, transnationalism 
affect identification – first amongst the general population, and second amongst migrants. 
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Chapter 5 (Diez Medrano, Ciornei and Apaydin 2019) moves the discussion from iden-
tity to solidarity, and investigates how EUCROSS participants respond to three scenarios: 
a general question about the aim of solidarity between peoples in the EU, and two more 
specific references, one to the economic crisis and the other to help on the occasion of 
a natural disaster in another EU country. Across all three dimensions, respondent an-
swers are calibrated from 1 = least supportive of solidarity aims or actions, to 5 = most 
supportive. And once again the “Eurosceptic Brits” perform according to type, with the 
lowest scores of all six countries on the general solidarity aim (3.8, compared to Germany 
4.4, Spain and Italy 4.6) and the natural disaster scenario (0.8, compared to 0.9 or above 
for the other countries), and the second lowest score concerning the economic crisis 
scenario (3.2, following Germany 3.1 – which was the main country which contributed 
to the Greek “bail-out”). When the multivariate analysis kicks in, the strongest correla-
tions with solidarity are not transnational experiences but more general cosmopolitan 
outlooks reflected in progressive, tolerant views, feelings of belonging to Europe, and 
leftist political ideology. 
Chapter 6 (Favell, Solgaard Jensen and Reimer 2019) brings in the EUMEAN narrative 
interview data in order to appreciate, at a more qualitative level, how “everyday trans-
nationalism”, especially cross-border mobility, is experienced and interpreted. It is also 
designed to respond to the wider question, which I emphasised earlier, about the ine-
qualities of mobility, and the idea that the benefits of European integration are mostly 
enjoyed by the elites and the upper classes – as a number of other important studies 
have indicated (Beckfield 2006; Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2015). A further question which 
arises is whether the wider inequalities in wealth, mobility and political power that exist 
in the EU generate mistrust, alienation and hostility to the European project on the part 
of “ordinary” citizens (de Vries 2018). In my view, the data presented in the chapter are 
insufficient to answer these questions. Most of the chapter consists of country-by-coun-
try summaries of key points in which one or a couple of interview quotes are used to 
illustrate the discussion. But the analysis needs more fleshing out, and it is disappointing 
that so little of the narrative material collected (60 interviews of average length 80 
minutes) is used. Nevertheless, the findings outlined in this chapter do draw out some 
interesting patterns and contradictions, which I deliberately view through a Brexit lens. 
In terms of an aggregated “transnationalism index” generated from EUCROSS data 
(range 0–18), the British are as equally transnational as the Danes and Germans (scoring 
5.9, 6.0 and 5.8 respectively), and more transnational than the Southern Europeans (Italy 
3.7, Spain 3.4)6. This North–South contrast within Europe is likely to be strongly linked to 
 
6 In Favell et al.’s chapter, the Romanian data is omitted, as this is a relatively new member-state and there-
fore not comparative, within the themes addressed in this chapter, to the five older EU members. 
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differences in wealth, which enables frequent cross-border travel and contact (Favell et 
al. 2019, pp. 172–173, citing Kuhn 2015). In terms of the additive “cosmopolitan index” 
which measures five cultural variables (food, music and literature; being a citizen of the 
world; positive view of ethnic diversity; and two solidarity measures relating to debt and 
disaster relief; scale 0–5), the UK again scores about average (3.2, compared to Denmark 
and Germany 3.0, Italy 3.7 and Spain 3.9). So, on the one hand, it seems that Britain “sits 
right in the middle of the distribution of many European core values” (Favell et al. 2019, 
p. 189). On the other hand, there are distinct nuances amongst the British regarding 
these characteristics: a greater openness to other parts of the world beyond Europe, and 
negative comments about “European immigrants” set within a broader narrative of Eu-
roscepticism. In conclusion, Favell et al. (2019, p. 190) observe a “growing differentiation 
within the UK, which is mixed up with people’s thoughts about the EU, the European 
region and the UK’s place in the globe: a contradictory mix”. 
Skipping over Chapters 7 and 8, respectively on Romanian and Turkish migrants7, 
some of these issues surrounding the complexity of social transnationalism and the am-
bivalent and “exiting” status of the UK within Europe are picked up by Recchi (2019) in 
his extended Epilogue to the book. Recchi’s concluding essay is arguably more negative 
than the mainstream narrative of the book would indicate: he describes his take on the 
current situation of Europe as “a glass three-quarters empty”. Some of this pessimism 
reflects a general “Eurogloom” that is signalled right up front by the editors of the book 
(Favell and Recchi 2019, p. 1), whilst the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum, which 
Recchi correctly predicted8, is undoubtedly the single most dramatic manifestation not 
only of a critical divide in British identity politics, but also of a wider EU malaise variously 
labelled in the book as Euroscepticism, Eurocrisis or Eurosclerosis. 
 
7 This is not to dismiss the importance of these chapters; quite the contrary, as they are amongst the most 
analytically insightful and detailed in the volume. These are the only chapters to fully adopt a mixed-meth-
ods approach, combining descriptive statistics, regression analyses, and narrative interviews. The Romanian 
chapter is especially wide-ranging in its scope and analytical methods, as it focuses on the only country in 
the seven-country study where both nationals (living in Romania) and migrants (living in five EU countries) 
are surveyed, enabling a three-way comparison between migrants, non-migrants and returnees (Bar-
bulescu, Ciornei and Varela 2019). Romanians have been the most numerous intra-EU migrants in recent 
decades, accounting for almost half of the 7 million Central and East European citizens registered as living 
in another EU country. Turks, on the other hand, are the most numerous non-EU migrant group living in 
Europe and are present in large numbers in several “Western” EU countries. The Turks in Europe are re-
vealed to be amongst the most transnational of all the groups surveyed in this book, an achievement no 
doubt linked to their history of migration and their multiple mobility links to “home” (Duru, Favell and Varela 
2019). But they are also revealed to be very heterogenous across the five EU countries surveyed, which 
limits the chapter’s ability to make meaningful generalisations. 
8 Ettore Recchi: personal communication. 
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Faced by the (for most observers) shock result of the Brexit vote, along with a trend 
to subtly restrict free movement and welfare rights in other EU countries in recent years, 
as well as an increase in nationality- and race-based discrimination during the 2010s, 
Recchi poses the question (2019, p. 257): “Are we heading towards a fusion or a fission 
of European societies?” The answer – by no means straightforward – is provided by mak-
ing reference to four key societal dimensions: borders, inequality, social norms and prac-
tices, and a sense of European identification. The results indicate, on balance, a move 
towards fission. This comes as a result of emergent borderings in the wake of terrorist 
attacks in several European cities and the Syrian refugee crisis, persistent and growing 
socio-economic and geographical inequalities, significant differences between Europe-
ans in their behaviours and identifications, and a re-emergence of nationalistic, even 
neo-fascist populism in many countries. And yet, as Favell and Recchi (2019, pp. 24–25) 
report in their introduction, many young Europeans take for granted the “banal” trans-
nationalism of frequent cross-border travel, study-abroad opportunities, foreign holi-
days in the sun or in the mountains, and are open to the possibility of international ca-
reers. For those with higher education, this pattern has become pretty much the norm, 
as it has for many young workers from the Central and East European accession coun-
tries who want to get better-paid jobs in the “West”. Of course, anti-social blemishes 
remain, like the young Bulgarian football supporters who directed fascist salutes, racist 
abuse and monkey chants at England’s black players during a recent international match 
in Sofia (14 October 2019). Not only in Bulgaria, but in many other countries of Europe, 
the “kick racism out of football” campaign has a long way to go. For the rest, what I 
would call the “easy” or “pragmatic” transnationalism of young Europeans, more based 
on everyday life than idealistic principles, will probably prevail but perhaps take on a 
more global scale of social responsibility, challenging inequality and militarism, and pur-
suing concerns and activism over global environmental change and the future of the 
planet (Favell and Recchi 2019, p. 25).  
 
A view from “Brexiting Britain” 
 
From the above review of Everyday Europe, the following can be distilled about the 
“positionality” of the UK within Europe with regard to various dimensions of social trans-
nationalism. On some measures, the UK’s scores are similar to those of the other EU 
countries surveyed: this is especially the case with quantifiable cross-border practices 
including tourism, travel, familiarity with other countries, and communications with 
friends and relatives abroad. Often the UK’s results are aligned to those of Denmark and 
Germany, the other two rich, Northern EU countries in the sample group. Culturally too 
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there are similarities, although I picked out two notable differences: a greater prefer-
ence for Asian food, linked to histories of colonialism and migration; and a lower pro-
pensity to watch foreign-language TV, which could reflect lack of familiarity with foreign 
languages and the lack of availability of foreign-language TV channels. It is also the case 
that, compared to other EU countries, a greater share of the UK’s transnational connec-
tions are not with Europe but with countries in the “global Anglosphere” such as the 
USA, Australia and Canada. 
Where the UK differed most from other countries is in the general field of identifica-
tion. We saw that the British had a significantly lower sense of “Europeanness” com-
pared to the other five EU countries surveyed in the book, as well as lower scores on 
“solidarity” with EU countries according to various scenarios such as debt repayment or 
help in the event of natural disaster. More so than other countries in the surveyed group, 
in the UK individuals’ “performance” on the solidarity/Euroscepticism continuum was 
more strongly related to having had transnational experiences. This indicates a greater 
degree of polarisation of the UK’s population between those who are “connected” to 
Europe via physical and virtual cross-border practices and a pro-EU identification, and 
those who are disconnected, Eurosceptic, and perhaps more oriented to a post-imperial 
Anglosphere of contacts, imaginaries and identifications. This difference was revealingly 
summed up by the outspoken Nigel Farage, during his time as leader of the United King-
dom Independence Party (UKIP). In a speech during the 2015 general election campaign, 
he said: 
 
I have to confess I do have a slight preference: I do think, naturally, that people from 
India and Australia are in some ways more likely to speak English, understand common 
law and have a connection to this country than some people that come perhaps from 
countries that haven’t fully recovered from being behind the Iron Curtain9.  
 
This quote offers an effective link between some of the indicative findings from Eve-
ryday Europe summarised above and my focus in the rest of this paper on Brexit, the 
immediate origins of which lie precisely in the 2015 general election. Prime Minister 
Cameron made it a re-election manifesto pledge to hold a referendum on remaining in 
or leaving the EU. He did so in order to counter the electoral rise of UKIP under Farage 
 
9 As reported in The Guardian, 22 April 2015 (see Mason 2015). Subsequently Farage quit UKIP to found the 
Brexit Party, a single-issue party committed to leaving the EU. Unable to win a seat in any of the recent 
general elections, Farage has been a long-standing Member of the European Parliament (MEP), ironically 
the only place where his voice could be heard as an elected politician. As leader of the Brexit Party he was 
a prominent figure in British political debate, at least up until the December 2019 General Election, alter-
nating episodes of intense media exposure with periods of relative obscurity. 
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and the long-running destabilising threat pose by the Eurosceptic right wing of the Con-
servative Party. 
The referendum was formally announced in February 2016 and the date fixed for 23 
June 2016. Immigration quickly became the lightening-rod for the pro-Leave campaign, 
ruthlessly pushed and manipulated by Farage, the Eurosceptic “Tories” and their sup-
porting tabloid newspapers, notably the Daily Mail, the Daily Express and the Sun, which 
screamed front-page anti-immigration headlines on a regular basis throughout the cam-
paign, exaggerating numbers and stoking fears about “mass immigration” from the EU. 
Previously “invisible” and identifying themselves as “European citizens” and “free mov-
ers” with every right to live and work in Britain, the 3.2 million EU citizens suddenly be-
came “visibilised” as “immigrants” and hence a  “problem” to be “solved” by the UK 
leaving the EU, which would enable the country to regain full control over its borders 
and sovereignty. What was not given sufficient emphasis in the political/media debate 
leading up to the referendum (but has become somewhat more evident since), was the 
huge economic contribution that EU migrants made to the British economy, at all skill 
levels from university research, finance and business, and the National Health Service, 
to lower-skilled jobs in the construction industry, hotels and restaurants, and agricultural 
work. Such pro-immigration arguments were largely silenced because of the toxic nature 
of the topic of immigration in the political sphere, and self-censored by the Conservative 
Party’s parallel commitment, already in place for several years and codified in successive 
election pledges, to reduce annual net migration to the “tens of thousands” (i.e. below 
100,000). Theresa May, the first post-referendum prime minister, was directly impli-
cated here – when Home Secretary, she introduced the so-called “hostile environment 
for immigrants” in 2012. 
The referendum result – 52% voted “Leave”, 48% “Remain” – confounded most of the 
poll predictions and was met with astonishment across Europe, where many saw it as a 
collective act of national self-harm. Scotland voted by a large majority (62%) for “Re-
main”, and Northern Ireland also had a majority “Remain” result (56%); in Wales there 
was a small margin in favour of “Leave”. This confirms Stephen Haseler’s (2017) thesis 
that the referendum result and the wider Europhobia that lay behind it was the product 
of a specifically English crisis of identity. The EUCROSS survey did not disaggregate the 
UK sample, but this issue was cogently argued by Nicholas Boyle writing in the Irish 
Times: 
 
Brexit is a collective English mental breakdown, English people living on the dreams of 
Empire never learned to see others as equals. (…) The question Brexit raises is not one of 
economics or politics, but of national psychology (Boyle 2018). 
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Beyond the geographical divisions between the “nations” of the UK, the referendum 
result also revealed a population sharply divided on other indicators, including a wide-
spread anger at the “politics of austerity” put in place to reduce the national debt which 
had soared in the wake of the global economic crisis. People were also angry at what 
they saw as the widening income and power divide between the wealthy business and 
political class located in London and the South-East and the “have-nots” distributed 
across the country but particularly concentrated in the North and the Midlands. Demog-
raphy and education also influenced how people voted in the referendum, with high 
correlations between voting “Remain” and higher levels of education, and between vot-
ing “Leave” and older age (Picascia, Romano and Capineri 2016). 
This leads me to suggest that there are two ways to interpret the success of the 
“Leave” campaign. One is that this is some kind of “natural” progression: a “restoration” 
of the UK’s rightful place as a globally connected independent political entity, free from 
the trammels of the EU and its bureaucratic rules, able to control its own destiny and to 
choose its own trading partners and which kinds of migrants to admit. In this way, the 
four decades and more of EU membership were a kind of historical aberration, particu-
larly as the EU has deepened its integration amongst its constituent members and be-
come a more powerful supranational political force since the time that the UK joined in 
1973. 
The other interpretation is to see the referendum result as a spectacular own goal, 
which started from the Cameron-inspired defensive move against the two-pronged at-
tack from UKIP and the anti-European Tory hardliners, but ended up with manifold un-
intended consequences. This is the line of argument that I now pursue. Extrapolating 
from the literature on so-called “wicked problems”, which I briefly review below, I see 
the referendum as a “wicked event” which opened a Pandora’s Box of fissures and ha-
treds, with multiple unintended consequences. These ruptures and antagonisms cut 
across social class, political parties, geography, race and identity within the UK and be-
yond. Even though the reality of Brexit has at last been secured, these divisions will en-
dure, probably for a long time. 
At many levels, the decision to hold the referendum was a huge strategic mistake: 
first, because it produced the outcome that the Cameron centrist faction of the Con-
servative Party did not anticipate; second, because it subsumed under a simple binary 
choice a wide range of complex issues and possible outcomes (mainly related to the fact 
that it was never made clear what “Leave” would actually entail); and third because the 
result produced a social and political cleavage which probably cannot be repaired, even 
after Brexit has happened. In retrospect one can only wonder: were there not other ways 
in which the pro- and anti-European tensions within the Conservative Party could have 
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been resolved? Or was the Europhobic feeding frenzy stoked by UKIP and its offshoot 
Brexit Party and the publicity given to the media-savvy soundbites of Farage always go-
ing to lead to some kind of crunch-point? Hence, the “wicked event” of the referendum 
has led to the chimera of finding a “satisfactory solution” to the long-running political 
horror-show of Brexit; a “wicked problem” that the UK population, as well as the rest of 
the EU, has been suffering for the past three and a half years, and will need to continue 
to endure for the “transition period” to the end of 2020. 
What is meant, exactly, by a “wicked problem”? In essence, it is a problem which is 
difficult or impossible to solve because of its complex interdependencies, inherent con-
tradictions and shifting nature. The use of the word “wicked” does not denote evil, but 
resistance to solution. Wicked problems are commonly seen to exist within planning and 
policy studies, organisational management, engineering, the environment, and political 
and social systems. Those which are especially intractable and exist on a global scale, 
such as global climate change, are sometimes called “super wicked problems” (Lazarus 
2009; Levin, Chambers, Bernstein and Auld 2012). Most of the literature on wicked prob-
lems pays homage to the foundational paper of Rittel and Webber (1973), which sets 
out ten defining characteristics. These have been added to, amalgamated and modified 
by subsequent writings (e.g. Camillus 2008; Conklin 2007; Head and Alford 2015; Ney 
and Verweij 2015). What follows below draws mainly on Rittel and Webber (1973), but 
with some modifications to reflect the specific nature of the Brexit process. 
First, there is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem; as a result, every wicked 
problem is essentially unique. Here, I combine two of Rittel and Webber’s ten criteria. 
There are so many factors and conditions, all embedded in a complex and shifting social 
and political context, that no two wicked problems are alike. Brexit fits this definitional 
criterion perfectly; there is no precedent, no parallel, and hence no solution by anal-
ogy10. Rittel and Webber (1973, p. 160) specify that many of the societal problems that 
planners and politicians grapple with are inherently “wicked” because of their social 
complexity and disagreement amongst multiple stakeholders and factions. This is in con-
trast with “tame” problems which are more technical and thus solvable by linear logic 
and standard, tested procedures. 
Second, every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another (set of) 
problem(s). Whilst an “ordinary” or a “tame” problem is self-contained, a wicked prob-
lem is complexly entwined with other problems, many of which have other root causes. 
Again, Brexit is a perfect exemplar of this condition. It is, above all, a symptom and an 
 
10 Greenland (2017 population 56,000) voted 53% to withdraw from the EU in a referendum of 1982 fol-
lowing a dispute over the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (which also helps to explain why Norway and Iceland 
stay outside the EU). Greenland joined the EU in 1973 as a constituent part of Denmark, but gained auton-
omy in 1979. 
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outcome of a historical struggle that the UK, and especially England, has with its position 
and role in the world throughout the postwar era. This struggle manifests itself in polar-
ised opinions regarding the country’s geopolitical identity as “European”, or as still linked 
to the Commonwealth and vestiges of “Empire”, or as part of the Atlantic axis via the 
“special relationship” with the United States (Bhambra 2017). Some of the EUCROSS 
data reinforce this ambivalence.  
The issue of Brexit also became conflated with emotive and instrumentalised conflicts 
over immigration. To a large extent, the “Leave” campaign was a proxy movement 
against the rise of immigration following EU enlargement. Especially in the declining in-
dustrial towns of the West Midlands and North of England, where the effects of austerity 
were most keenly felt amongst working-class voters, and in the rural towns of Eastern 
England where the influx of East European workers to take up jobs in agricultural field 
work and in processing plants changed the make-up of the population, immigrants were 
scapegoated for a range of other “problems” which were evident or perceived, such as 
pressure on housing, schools and health services, or rising unemployment and lack of 
jobs for “native” workers. 
Despite now being a done deal, the Brexit process is ongoing and continues to create 
problems for the future. For a time, the apparent replacement of the long-standing du-
opoly of Labour and Conservative (both divided over Brexit) with the two “tribes” of 
“Leave” and “Remain”, appeared to re-map the political landscape of Britain. In the 
months leading up to the 12 December 2019 General Election, called by Boris Johnson 
to break the logjam over Brexit, other political parties threatened the traditional binary 
divide, notably the temporarily resurgent Liberal Democrats (the most pro-Remain 
party, committed to cancelling Brexit by boldly revoking Article 50), and the newly-
founded, Farage-led Brexit Party (wanting a “no-deal” exit from the EU). But the Lib-
Dems performed disappointingly in the election and the Brexit Party, by not fielding can-
didates in safe “Tory” seats, were complicit allies in the Conservative victory. Purged of 
their more outspoken “Remainer” members who were controversially expelled from the 
Party by Johnson, the Conservatives scored a stunning victory, and the path to clinching 
Brexit was assured. 
On the economic front, it is clear that the protracted uncertainty over the Brexit ne-
gotiations has had and will continue to have profound consequences. These include the 
difficulty of industries and businesses to forward-plan (hence many investments have 
been put on hold), a fall in the value of the pound (making imports more expensive), and 
shortages of migrant labour in key sectors such as agriculture, hotels and catering, and 
the National Health Service. On the broader political front there are concerns that Brexit 
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will ultimately lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom through a Scottish Independ-
ence Referendum (followed by Scotland remaining in or rejoining the EU) and, less im-
minently, the reconstitution of a United Ireland. All of which illustrates further defining 
features of “wicked problems” according to Rittel and Webber (1973): policies to con-
front such problems have no stopping rule and discount the future irrationally. 
A third key feature of wicked problems is that their always difficult solutions are not 
“true” or “false”, or “right or “wrong”, only “better” or “worse”. It seems to be in the 
nature of wicked problems that they result in more “losers” than “winners”. On this last 
point EU Brexit chief negotiator Michel Barnier opined on 22 October 2019 that “Brexit 
is a lose-lose. No-one, not even Mr. Farage, has been able to show me any proof of the 
added value of Brexit”; whilst earlier in the year, on 6 February, European Council Pres-
ident Donald Tusk famously declared that there was “a special place in hell for those 
who backed Brexit without a plan”11. An irony of Brexit, which only emphasises its inter-
nal lack of logic and “wickedness”, is that many of those who voted for it in the peripheral 
regions of the UK affected by austerity, industrial decline and economic restructuring 
are precisely those who will likely be more negatively affected by the impact of Brexit. 
And yet, these were the voters and constituencies which, in significant numbers, 
switched from Labour to Conservative in the recent General Election, seduced by the 
simple campaign slogan to “Get Brexit Done”. In the past, these “pro-Brexit” regions 
have received substantial economic support from EU Structural Funds, which will be lost 
in the more open, deregulated economy of a post-Brexit future. 
Another set of “losers” from Brexit are the 3.2 million EU nationals residing in the UK 
(as well as the 1 million UK nationals living elsewhere in the EU), whose identity and 
rights as “EU citizens” and “free movers” are about to be lost. In research which I carried 
out with University of Sussex colleagues Aija Lulle and Laura Moroșanu on young EU 
migrants in Britain, in which 60 participants were interviewed both before and after the 
referendum, several consistent messages came through12. These included a sense of be-
ing “victimised” during the build-up to the referendum, a subsequent awareness of no 
longer feeling welcome in Britain, and a prevailing uncertainty over their future in the 
country. For many, especially those planning to stay long-term, the referendum result 
and, now, the reality of Brexit, constitute a rupture in their lives. Whilst some interview-
ees were planning to hasten their return “home” (or move to another EU country), those 
committed to staying, for financial, career, lifestyle or personal reasons, were having to 
 
11 Reports in The Guardian, 7 February 2019 and 23 October 2019. 
12 Research funded by the EU Horizon 2020 project “YMOBILITY”, 2015-2018, grant no. 649491. For exam-
ples of this research see Lulle, Moroșanu and King (2018); Lulle, King, Dvorakova and Szkludarek (2019); 
Mazzilli and King (2018). 
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contemplate the bureaucratic challenges of applying for the new “settled status” or, ul-
timately, citizenship. According to our research, EU migrants in the UK also felt a change 
in the “atmosphere”, which has become more nationalistic, with rising levels of verbal 
abuse in the streets and workplace, and hate speech in the public sphere. 
A fourth cluster of three linked criteria for the specification of a wicked problem relate 
to issues of stakeholder conflict and responsibility. These arise not from the original for-
mulation of Rittel and Webber (1973) but from subsequent elaborations by Camillus 
(2008), Conklin (2007) and Levin et al. (2012). Firstly, those responsible for solving the 
problem are also those who created it. The Conservative Party, which called the referen-
dum, has been at the forefront of efforts to try to implement the “will of the people” 
and “deliver Brexit”. For more than three years, successive Conservative prime ministers 
– David Cameron (who resigned immediately after the referendum), Theresa May and 
Boris Johnson – failed to achieve this and had to ask the EU for repeated postponements 
of the “exit” date, most recently to 31 January 2020. Initially, the Conservative Party lost 
its parliamentary majority in the snap election called by Theresa May in June 2017, re-
sulting in a “hung parliament” unable to push Brexit “over the line”. Following May’s 
resignation, Johnson assumed the role of prime minister in July 2019, voicing more vig-
orously to “get Brexit done”. As a consequence of the December 2019 election, Brexit is 
the new reality.  
The other two issues follow on from what has been said above: stakeholders have 
radically different worldviews and different frames for understanding the problem; and 
any solution to the wicked problem of Brexit requires a great number of people to change 
their mindset or behaviour. 
That different worldviews frame the problem of Brexit is obvious. Even within the 
Conservative Party there are members of parliament (MPs) who are broadly pro-Euro-
pean and others – the so-called (and misnamed) European Research Group – who are 
ardent anti-EU ideologues. A consolidated view in the Labour Party was compromised 
by the fact that many Labour MPs who themselves voted “Remain” represent constitu-
encies in the North of England which voted massively – more than 70% – in favour of 
“Leave”. Because of this conflict, many lost their seats in the December 2019 election. 
As primary stakeholders with the ultimate collective responsibility for decision-making, 
MPs had divided loyalties: should they vote according to their own view of the UK’s re-
lationship with the EU; should they align with their constituents’ majority vote in the 
referendum; or should they follow their Party’s line on Brexit? Should they put their 
country first (taking into consideration the economic evidence on the negative impact 
of Brexit); or their Party; or their own careers in the election? Should they follow their 
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conscience, beliefs and instincts; or should they vote “holding their noses” to achieve a 
particular collective outcome?  
Finally, there is a set of issues surrounding the difficulty, if not impossibility, of finding 
a satisfactory solution, and the constraints of time and resources when confronting 
wicked problems. These criteria are as follows. In seeking a solution to a wicked problem, 
there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, as every attempt creates its own ef-
fects. And secondly, the constraints that the problem is subject to and the resources re-
quired to solve it change over time. These statements, too, ring true in the case of Brexit. 
Any solution proposed created new problems. All the “Leave” scenarios (“hard” vs “soft” 
Brexit, or a “clean break” with “no deal”) were calculated to have negative economic 
implications and are in fact only the first step along the tortuous path of re-negotiating 
trading, migration, and other relations with Europe and other world regions. Revoking 
Article 50 and “cancelling” Brexit would have been a rejection of plebiscite democracy, 
with obvious political and social ramifications. And a new referendum – a “people’s 
vote” – would have risked reinforcing existing divisions and potentially creating new 
ones. Thus, the “solutions” tend to create their own new lives and may turn out to be 
worse than the symptoms of the original problem. So, in the case of Brexit, the solution, 
whatever it turns out to be over the coming months of negotiation and transition, be-
comes the (new) problem. Which is an interesting twist on one of Rittel and Webber’s 
more intriguing statements: “The formulation of a wicked problem is the problem!” 
(1973, p. 161, their emphasis). Meantime, “immigration”, the dominant discursive trope 
during the original Brexit debate, has faded into the background as an “issue” (except in 
terms of the new labour shortages noted above), with trade deals and the thorny prob-
lem of the Irish border (between the Republic and Northern Ireland) becoming the main 
topics of debate once the real negotiations start. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What I have tried to do in this review paper and “think piece” is to provide a sympa-
thetic and occasionally critical summary of Everyday Europe, hopefully doing justice to 
the contributions of all of its authors, if not all of its multiple findings. Reflecting my own 
research interests, I have stressed the role of migration and other human mobility forms, 
the issue of European identity, and the inequalities that seem to underpin everything, 
and need more exposure. I have taken an unashamedly UK-centred vision of the book, 
in order to highlight this country’s complex positionality within the EU and the distinc-
tiveness of its performance on some of the cross-border practices and indices of identi-
fication. These enabled me, in the second half of the paper, to make some analytical 
links to the major social and political issue which has convulsed the UK (and the EU) over 
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the past three-plus years: the saga of Brexit. But I want to close this piece with all guns 
blazing. “The people” were wrong. They were duped, lied to, manipulated and brow-
beaten by the insidious rhetoric of fear about immigration, including an “invasion” of 80 
million Turks about to join the EU. The cynical and aggressive mass targeting of “recep-
tive” consumers of online media propagated an extraordinary melange of lies and half-
truths over which there was no regulatory control. If this is the new model of political 
discourse and electioneering, where truth has no value, then I fear for our democratic 
future.  
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